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ARE WE SIMS? HOW COMPUTER
SIMULATIONS REPRESENT AND WHAT THIS
MEANS FOR THE SIMULATION ARGUMENT
ABSTRACT
N. Bostrom’s simulation argument and two additional assumptions
imply that we likely live in a computer simulation. The argument is
based upon the following assumption about the workings of realistic
brain simulations: The hardware of a computer on which a brain simu-
lation is run bears a close analogy to the brain itself. To inquire whether
this is so, I analyze how computer simulations trace processes in their
targets. I describe simulations as fictional, mathematical, pictorial, and
material models. Even though the computer hardware does provide a
material model of the target, this does not suffice to underwrite the sim-
ulation argument because the ways in which parts of the computer hard-
ware interact during simulations do not resemble the ways in which
neurons interact in the brain. Further, there are computer simulations of
all kinds of systems, and it would be unreasonable to infer that some
computers display consciousness just because they simulate brains rather
than, say, galaxies.
1. Introduction
There is a fairly high probability that this paper is only a simulated
paper, that I am only simulated and that you, honorable reader, are simu-
lated, too. We all likely live in a computer simulation or are sims, for
short.1 This at least follows from the so-called simulation argument and
two fairly plausible assumptions. The simulation argument has first been
formulated by Bostrom (2003) and since then received much attention.2
The main idea behind the argument is as follows. Suppose that
mankind continues to exist for at least another 100 years or so. Assume
further that the available computing power continues to increase quickly.
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We or our descendants will then enter a “posthuman” age and become
“posthumans,” as Bostrom puts it. Posthumans have the computing power
to run large-scale computer simulations (CSs, for short) that imitate the
lives of thousands of humans in great detail. In particular, the simulations
imitate the processes in the brains of the people at the levels of neurons or
below in a very realistic manner. Bostrom calls such simulations ancestor
simulations. If such simulations are run, it seems likely that those parts of
the hardware that underlie the simulations of the brains must become con-
scious and be subject to experiences of the kind we have. This at least is
plausible if consciousness is not a matter of the underlying substrate, but
rather of its structure. Bostrom assumes that, at some stage, the experiences
associated with the computers on which ancestor simulations are run are
qualitatively indistinguishable from our own experiences. Suppose now
that many ancestor simulations are run. Then most human-like experiences
are associated with computer hardware and thus belong to simulated persons.
But why then should we think that we are real rather than simulated?
Whether the argument is successful depends, amongst other things,
on how successful CSs represent their targets. The argument presumes
that the programmed computer on which a brain simulation is run is very
similar to the brain. This assumption may be justified by saying that the
computer is a detailed material model of the brain and thus represents the
brain on the basis of a close similarity. The aim of this paper is to examine
whether this is true.
The question of how computer simulations represent their targets and
how they help us gain knowledge is central to the philosophy of computer
simulations. As a couple of authors (e.g., Stöckler 2000, 366; Barber-
ousse, et al. 2009, 558) have urged, this branch of philosophy should
explain how computer simulations produce knowledge. A couple of
answers have been put forward, e.g., by Stöckler (2000), Barberousse, et
al. (2009) and Beisbart (2012), but most of them do not focus on the hard-
ware, which is crucial for my project. Contrary to Barberousse, et al.
(2009), I will argue that a programmed computer can be used as a mater-
ial model of its target. This does not suffice, however, for the simulation
argument, or so I shall suggest.
For the purposes of this paper, I assume that computer simulations
provide solutions or approximate solutions to equations that represent the
dynamics of a target system. This notion of CS is in rough accordance
with the definitions given by Hartmann (1996, Sec. 2.2) and by Humphreys
(2004, 110–14). Some part of my argument is restricted to deterministic
simulations, see below for details.
The paper begins with a presentation of Bostrom’s argument. Sec. 3
identifies the central assumption about computer simulations in the argu-
ment. That assumption turns on the question of how CSs represent. This
question is discussed in Sec. 4. The results are applied to the simulation
argument in Sec. 5.
2. The Simulation Argument
The simulation argument (Bostrom 2003) is supposed to show that at
least one of the following three statements is true.
S1 Human-level civilizations in the universe are likely to become
extinct before they enter a posthuman stage.
S2 Posthumans are unlikely to run many ancestor CSs.
S3 It is likely that we live in a CS.
The statements do not only refer to our human civilization and a related
posthuman civilization, but also to other possible human-level civiliza-
tions and their posthuman successors. The idea is that a cosmic census of
human-like experiences is taken.
Suppose for a moment that the disjunction of S1, S2 and S3, i.e.,
(S1∨ S2∨S3) is true. Then, if S1 and S2 are false, S3 must be true. There-
fore, if certain contingent assumptions about posthumans, viz. the negations
of S1 and S2, hold true, we live in a CS with a high probability.
Does the disjunction hold? The answer turns on the success of the
simulation argument. The latter proceeds from an assumption called “sub-
strate-independence”:
Provided a system implements the right sort of computational structures and
processes, it can be associated with conscious experiences. It is not an essen-
tial property of consciousness that it is implemented on carbon-based
biological neural networks inside a cranium: silicon-based processors inside
a computer could in principle do the trick as well. (Bostrom 2003, 244)
We may summarize this by saying that matter with suitable structural prop-
erties will be associated with consciousness.3 More on computation will
follow below.
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The simulation argument is now supposed to work as follows.
Assume that both S1 and S2 are false. Human-level civilizations reach a
posthuman stage with a fairly large probability p1 and posthumans run
many ancestor simulations with a fairly large probability p2. Let the
expected number of humans that are simulated by a posthuman society be
Nsim and the average number of human-level beings in a civilization be
Nreal. Here, Nsim is much larger than Nreal because the expectation value of
simulated humans Nsim is conditioned on societies in which many ances-
tor simulations are run. As posthuman simulations of humans are very
realistic, the hardware parts that simulate humans are associated with con-
sciousness and human-like experiences according to the assumption of
substrate-independence. The expected number of sims under all streams
of human-like experiences then is p1 × p2 × Nsim, while the expected
number of humans is Nreal. The former number is much larger than the
latter because Nsim is much larger than Nreal and p1 × p2 is not negligible.
Since we expect there to be many more sims than humans, the probabil-
ity that conscious experience like our own belongs to sims is high, and this
just is S3.4 All in all, S3 seems to follow from a denial of S1 and S2, which
means that the disjunction is true. But is it in fact?
3. Computer Simulations
The simulation argument draws on the following crucial assumption. If
a computer simulates brains in a very realistic manner, then hardware parts
of the computer become associated with human-like experiences. This
assumption can be split up into substrate independence and a second assump-
tion as follows:
SI: Matter with suitable structural properties will be associated with
human-like experiences.
Sim: If a computer simulation successfully represents the dynamics of
a brain in a very realistic manner, the computer hardware will
have suitable structural properties.
Here, suitable structural properties are not just properties of computer and
brain states; they also concern the dynamical behaviors of both systems.
More on this will follow below.
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Let us take substrate independence for granted for the sake of argu-
ment and focus on Sim. Sim may seem plausible at first sight. How can
computer simulations represent the dynamics of a brain in a very realistic
way without there being a thorough-going similarity? There are neverthe-
less doubts about Sim. To discuss Sim, we have to answer two questions:
Q1: What sorts of structural properties does a computer hardware
need to successfully simulate brains realistically?
Q2: Are these sorts of structural properties sufficient to grant con-
scious experiences according to SI?
Turn first to Q1. The answer depends on what exactly we mean by computer
simulations. Different types of simulations of the brain are conceivable. It
may be possible to build special computer hardware that provides a material
model of the human brain. That is, the workings of the hardware closely
resemble those of the brain. For instance, microprocessors or electronic
devices may be connected as are neurons in the brain. By definition, the
hardware of such a computer is very similar to the brain, and the similarity
may be so tight that substrate-independence can be brought to bear on the case.
In the following, I will bracket such CSs in favor of simulations run
on all-purpose machines. The simplest example of such a computer is a
von Neumann machine,5 but other types of hardware such as those used
for parallel computing are available, too. My restriction is legitimate for a
number of reasons. A number of brain simulations are in fact run on such
machines.6 Simulations on special computers are more difficult to realize
than simulations running on all-purpose machines. Finally, ancestor sim-
ulations in the simulation argument are supposed to imitate not only
human brains but also their environments, and it is clear that at least these
parts of the simulations have to be simulations run on all-purpose
machines. Since the simulations of the brains have to be coupled to the
simulations of the brains’ environments, it seems promising to simulate
the brains on all-purpose machines too. Indeed, an extremely ambitious
project for brain simulations, the Blue Brain Project7 uses a Blue Gene/P
supercomputer, which is used for other purposes also.
If we restrict ourselves to all-purpose machines in this way, what will
be important for the success of the simulation is the software and not so
much the hardware. The argument below in Sec. 4.4 will make this plain.
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The answer to question Q1 turns also on the question of what is
meant by saying that the simulations of the brains are very realistic. I take
this to mean that the simulations trace a lot of characteristics, i.e., that they
are detailed; that the values of these characteristics are traced with high
temporal resolution, and to high accuracy. The latter is to say that the
quantitative predictions of the simulations come out true to a very good
approximation.
It may be argued that very powerful computers display conscious
states because they perform difficult cognitive tasks, e.g., because they
perform computations (see Chalmers [2011] for discussion). But this does
not seem to be the point of Bostrom’s simulation argument because he
would then not need to refer to simulations of the brain specifically. My
question thus is whether the hardware is associated with conscious expe-
riences because it simulates a human brain, and not whether it is because
it performs computations. For simplicity, I will assume that the target of
the computer simulation consists in one single brain; this assumption can
easily be relaxed.
4. What Does Successful Representation Through Computer
Simulations Imply?
Suppose then, that a computer simulation successfully models a
brain in a very realistic manner. What does this mean? What are the impli-
cations for the relationship between the computer and its target, i.e., the
brain? To answer this question, I will characterize computer simulations
as models that represent their targets.
To begin it is useful to recap a few things about modeling quite gen-
erally.8 Modelers are interested in a target and take an indirect route to
learn about it: They investigate substitutes of their targets. For instance,
they use a scale model of a car instead of a real car to learn about the
behavior of the latter. The substitute is often called the source (Suárez
2003, 225). Once results about the source have been established, they are
transferred back to the target. The sources of representational models vary
greatly. They include mathematical equations, merely imagined systems,
pictures and movies, and material objects. Depending on the type of
source, we obtain mathematical, fictional, pictorial, and material models.
As it happens, CSs are or contain models of all four types. There may even
be additional types of models, but they do not matter for our purposes.
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4.1 Computer simulations as mathematical models
Whatever computer simulations do, they perform calculations and
thus provide solutions to mathematical equations. The equations and their
solutions are empirically interpreted and used to learn about a target. This
is to say that each CS includes a mathematical model.
Mathematical models represent in that their equations contain infor-
mation about the target. For instance, under a common interpretation, the
equation:
F = −kx (1)
constrains combinations of the magnitudes of force F and of some dis-
placement x in some system.9 Ideally, the constraint expressed by the
equation holds exactly in the target system. In this case, it is immediately
clear how the equations can be used to learn about the target: From the
displacement and the value of k, we can infer how large the force is. But
typical mathematical models abstract from many details and are highly
idealized. For instance, Eq. (1) may abstract from an additional force due
to friction. In this case, one has to be more careful about interpreting the
solutions to the equations in terms of the target.
Often, computer simulations do not solve the equations that working
scientists first write down to model a system. For instance, CSs do not
provide exact solutions to differential equations, but rather use e.g. finite
difference methods to approximate the true solutions for a finite set of
times or grid points. Nevertheless, the computer does evaluate some equa-
tions. It is thus common to distinguish between the conceptual model, i.e.,
the equations working scientists start with, and the computerized model,
i.e., the set of equations that the computer actually evaluates (Schlesinger,
et al. 1979).10 It is still possible to infer information about the target from
the computer simulations if the differences between solutions to the con-
ceptual and the computerized models are known to be small.
4.2 Computer simulations as fictional models
Since the equations that are evaluated using CSs do not often provide
literally true descriptions of the target, it is useful to say that they refer to
a merely imagined system distinct from the target. In fact, CSs are often
described in terms of a system of which even the ontology differs from
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that of the target. For instance, so-called N-body simulations in physics
are naturally said to describe a system of artificial particles and their
behavior.11 But many N-body simulations assume artificial particles that
do not exist in reality because there are no particles with roughly the prop-
erties of the artificial particles. The artificial particles constitute a merely
imagined system. That system is used to represent the target system
because it is in some way similar to it. Values of some physical charac-
teristics of the fictional system are used to infer the values of physical
characteristics in the target or at least its qualitative behavior. As a conse-
quence, the imagined system that the simulations directly refer to provides
a fictional model of the target of the simulations.
When I call such a model fictional, as do Frigg and Hartmann (2012),
I do not mean to imply that related modeling amounts to storytelling. The
point is only that modelers imagine a source distinct from the target, but
somehow similar to it. The source then is considered in thought only. Typ-
ically, the source is constructed using a lot of idealizations such that it
lends itself to a straight-forward description in the terms of a theory. The
theory then is used to run inferences about the source.12
As with the mathematical equations constitutive of computer simula-
tions, it is useful to distinguish conceptual and computerized fictional models
behind computer simulations. The conceptual model is typically constructed
using components to which well-known physical laws apply. The com-
puterized model instead follows the dynamics that is defined in terms of
the computerized mathematical model, e.g. suitable difference equations.
4.3 Computer simulations as pictorial models
Many simulations visualize their outputs using movies or pictures
and thus define pictorial models. Pictures and movies allow for insights
that would not be possible otherwise (Humphreys 2004, 113). The pic-
tures describe imagined systems that are similar to the target. Due to the
analogies, we can learn about the target by looking at the picture. For
instance, a picture produced by a simulation contains information about
the imagined source, which in turn looks similar to the target.
4.4 Computer simulations as material models
Finally, the computer is a physical object and may thus be thought to
form a material model of the target of a simulation. Other famous mater-
ial models include scale models of cars. Scientists observe the source or
experiment on it to learn about the target. Most, if not all material models
represent in virtue of being similar to their target. For instance, they
resemble their targets in shape or in the way they are composed of parts.
Often, the similarity between the source and the target can be described
using an isomorphism.13
But are computers really material models of the targets of CSs in this
sense? On the face of it, this seems implausible. It is true that simulation
scientists interfere with the computer to learn about their targets, but a
programmed computer does not seem to bear analogies to its target in the
way a scale model does. A computer, it may be said, is an instrument that
performs certain computations to solve equations from a model. Why
should it be similar to the objects to which the computations refer?
Nevertheless, the computer is used to learn about the target system
and this is impossible if there is no close relationship between the com-
puter and the target. That the processes in the programmed computer bear
a similarity to those in the target is also suggested by Hartmann’s claim
that a simulation “imitates one process by another process” (Hartmann
1996, Sec. 2.2).
In the following, I will show that there is in fact an analogy between
the processes in the hardware and in the target. This task is difficult
because computers are very complicated material systems. I will thus rely
on an idealized description of the computer. In obtaining this description,
I will be favorable to the idea that there is an analogy between the pro-
grammed computer and the target of a CS.14
My argument is restricted to deterministic simulations of a target that
is deterministic at the modeled level of description. I assume that, when-
ever an instance of “simulated” time has lapsed and the values of the
relevant characteristics have been evaluated, they are printed. My argument
is based upon formal work by Burks (1975) and Norton and Suppe (2001),
but I will greatly simplify matters.15 The formalism has been referred to in
the philosophical literature, e.g., in Barberousse et al. (2009), but has not
been well explained (Norton and Suppe [2001] refer to yet unpublished
work by F. Suppe).
As the CS is run on the computer, the latter sequentially prints
outputs. The outputs consist of numbers which are in turn the values of
certain functions. These functions solve the dynamical equations from the
computerized model. In the terms of Chalmers (2011, 327), this is to say
that the computer hardware implements computations. For simplicity, we
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assume that all numbers that are values of the functions for the same time
t are printed together in one line. Thus one line of the output specifies a
state of the computerized fictional model.
The printing of one line is proximally caused by a process that takes
place within the computer and immediately precedes the printing. At a
coarser level of description, we may say that the printing is preceded by
one particular computer state that is causally responsible for it.
Consider now the states of the computerized model and the computer
states just defined. We have effectively defined a mapping between the
states: For each computer state, there is exactly one state of the comput-
erized model. That is the state defined by the values of characteristics
printed by the computer immediately after the computer state. Suppose
now that the computer goes through a sequence of states, call them c1, c2
etc. We map these states to states in the computerized model in the way
just explained. This defines the so-called simulation mapping φ. If the
computer does in fact provide solutions to the equations from the com-
puterized model, and we assume so, then φ(c2) follows after φ(c1) and so
on. Computer states that succeed each other are mapped to states of the
computerized model that succeed each other too. The simulation mapping
thus preserves the temporal order of the states. We have constructed a
homomorphism between the dynamics of both systems.
The states of the computerized model in turn are stand-ins of the
states of the target system. Thus, states of the computerized models can be
mapped to states of the target system. Typically, the values of certain char-
acteristics that define a state of the computerized model are taken to be
values of certain characteristics of the target. This leads to a description of
the target. In general, the description will be coarse because the comput-
erized model abstracts from many features of the target. So properly
speaking, each state of the computerized model corresponds to a class of
target states. There is thus a second mapping ψ from states of the com-
puterized model to classes of target states.
If the computerized model successfully traces the dynamics within
the target, then ψ again preserves the dynamics. That is, if φ(c2) follows
φ(c1) in the computerized model, then states of class ψ(φ(c2)) follow a
state from class ψ(φ(c1)). If this condition were not fulfilled, then the
computerized model could not be used to predict and explain the dynam-
ics of the target. Every prediction or explanation of the dynamics of the
target works as follows: We start with an initial state of the target and
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obtain a coarse description of it. This description is used to define a state
of the computerized model. The computerized model is evaluated for later
times. The states of the computerized model are then translated back to
coarse state descriptions of the target. They provide information about
how the target evolves only if ψ preserves the dynamics.
We can now compose φ and ψ to form a map φ ◦ ψ that maps states
of the computer to classes of target states. Since both maps φ and ψ pre-
serve the dynamics in the way described, so does the composed map φ ◦
ψ. Two computer states that succeed each other are mapped to two classes
of target states that succeed each other. Again, this map is crucial for the
inferential power of the simulations. Using the computer simulation, we
can draw inferences about the target in the following way. A coarse
description of the target’s initial state is used to define an initial state of
the computerized model. ψ maps this state to the class of states to which
the initial state of the target belongs. The computer is brought into a state
that makes it first print the numbers that correspond to the initial state of
the computerized model. As the computer program is run, it goes through
a series of computer states ci. These states correspond to states of the com-
puterized model, and the latter are mapped to classes of target states.
Running the computer simulations, we can obtain information about, or
coarse descriptions of, the next states to follow in the target.
Thus, states of the programmed computer can be brought in a one-to-
one correspondence with classes of target states in such a way that the
dynamic order is preserved. This provides a dynamic analogy between the
behaviors of the target and of the programmed computer, and this analogy
is used to run inferences about the target. In this sense, the programmed
computer does form a material model of the target. This result also makes
good on Hartmann’s claim that computer simulations imitate processes in
their targets.
The construction of our maps is based upon coarse descriptions of
the computer and the target. At a finer level of description, there are many
different computer states that lead to the same printout (Barberousse, et al.
2009, 565). This is not a problem though. For our purposes, we need only
a homomorphism at some level of detail.
Barberousse et al. (2009) think that the hardware of the programmed
computer would only provide a material model of the target if the com-
puter always stored the values of the variables in the computerized model
at the same places. Suitably paired states of the computer and target would
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then be similar, and one could map computer states to states of the com-
puterized model by just reading the values off the relevant parts of the
memory of the computer. For instance, there would be one place for
storing the value of the position of the ith particle in the computerized
model, another place for storing that of the (i + 1)th particle and so on.
According to Barberousse et al. (2009, 564–65), all this does not work,
however, because, as a matter of fact, the values of one variable are not
always stored at the same place of the computer hardware.
This argument is too quick. First, for the computer to be a material model
of the target it is not required that the target states and the computer states
resemble each other. The dynamic analogy pointed out above is sufficient
to learn about the target using the simulation. Second, there is no reason
to require that the map φ be constructed as the authors require, i.e., that
the states of the computerized model can be read off in the way they think.
But it is true that the analogy mediated via the mapping φ ◦ ψ is
extremely thin and in a way peculiar. φ ◦ ψ maps global states to classes
of global states and preserves their dynamics, but does not relate the ways
in which the parts of the computer interact with each other to those ways
in which the parts of the target interact with each other. And we know of
course that computers work quite differently than do all sorts of targets of
computer simulations.16
Why doesn’t the mapping φ ◦ ψ establish an analogy between the
inner workings of the target and the computer? The map ψ is unproblem-
atic in this respect because the computerized model qua an imagined
system will most often be similar to the target, and the inner workings of
the computerized model and the target will be analogous if the simulation
is successful. The question rather is whether the simulation map φ that
maps computer states into states of the computerized model can in some
way be thought to map the inner workings of the computer to those of the
computerized model. Let us thus concentrate on φ and regard the com-
puterized model as an adequate stand-in for the target.
φ maps global states to each other, but it induces mappings that relate
parts of the target to the computer.17 Assume that the target is composed
of subsystems T1 – Tn. A subgroup of the characteristics that define the
computerized model and that figure in its equations refer to T1, others to
T2, and so on. Hold those characteristics fixed that belong to T2, . . . , Tn
and hold T1 fixed too, apart from one aspect (the value of one natural
characteristic) which is varied very slightly. Varying this aspect leads to a
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set of global states of the target. Consider those states of the computer that
are mapped to the variety of states via φ. If these are global states that
differ with respect to a natural subsystem of the computer, the inner work-
ings of the target would be mapped to those of the computer. This is not
the case, however. The set of computer states that arise are those that lead
to almost the same output, in which only small variations with respect to
the value of one printed number are allowed. But if we describe the com-
puter in a natural way, there are a lot of very different states of the
programmed computer that can lead to one of the states. A reason is that
such an output can arise on the basis of different hardware states. If the
values of the same variables are not always stored at the same fixed
places, as Barberousse et al. (2009) rightly claim, then the computer states
that are mapped to our variety of target states do not only differ in terms
of a certain local characteristic. For instance, if we run the same pro-
grammed computer from different simulated times to arrive at exactly the
same final simulated time and at the same printout, the computer states
responsible for the printouts will likely differ from each other. All this is
to say that the inner workings of the computer are not mapped to those of
the target.18
The same point can be made by saying that natural properties of the
target do not correspond to natural properties of the computer. A natural
property can be regarded as the set of states with that property. Natural
properties of the computer and its parts are not mapped to natural proper-
ties of the target, and vice versa.
Even if the same physical part of the computer always corresponds
to one characteristic of the target, proximate causes of phenomena in the
computer and in the computerized model are not mapped to each other.
Consider, for instance, a particle i in an N-body simulation. That the par-
ticle takes such and such a position at a certain time can proximally be
explained in terms of the positions of all particles at the previous time and
the forces that the other particles exert on i. The proximal causes for a reg-
ister state corresponding to the position of the particle at that time are a
small number of other register states being such and such. For instance,
the register state may result from an addition, thus the previous state of the
register and that of another register provide a proximal explanation of the
state. When we trace back the causal history of the register state a bit
more, we note further that hardware parts that encode parts of the program
are crucial for the causal order in the hardware. But the program thus
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“materialized” has no counterpart in the target system. This shows that the
causal orders of the inner workings in the computer and in the computerized
model are very different. This is reflected by the fact that the computer hard-
ware and the target are not in general subject to the same dynamic equations
(cf. Barberousse, et al. 2009).19
In sum, even though there is a dynamic analogy between the com-
puter and its target, the parts of the computer hardware do not interact in
a similar way as do the building blocks of the computerized model (and
thus those of the target).
5. Consequences for the Simulation Argument
We are now clear about the representation of a target in a computer
simulation. What are the implications for consciousness if a brain is sim-
ulated in a very realistic manner? This is to raise Q2. The answer to this
question is of course not a matter of armchair philosophy. However, since
at least present simulations of the human brain are still quite limited and
since it will be difficult to find out whether parts of the hardware become
conscious anyway, the only way to answer the question right now is to
judge the plausibility of the possible answers.
We need not much consider the first three modes of representation. That
the equations of the mathematical model are solved using the computer
doesn’t tell us anything relevant about the computer (recall that we are asking
whether computers resemble a brain because they simulate brains). Second,
that the computerized model represents the brain in a sufficiently realist
manner to display the right sort of structure according to SI implies that the
model is structurally equivalent to the brain, but this similarity by itself leads
us nowhere in the physical world. Third, movies on the monitor may look
very similar to what’s going on in slices of the brain. But the information in
movies is not detailed enough to make us think that the monitor and the brain
are sufficiently analogous for the monitor to display consciousness, granted SI.
However, on top of this the programmed computer serves as a mate-
rial model of the target in the sense described above. There is a similarity
between the dynamics of the computer and the target. The crucial question
then is whether the computer as a physical system and the brain are suffi-
ciently similar that the hardware parts are associated with consciousness.
The problem is that the analogy concerns only global states and their
dynamic order. The parts of the target and the parts of the computer do not
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interact in similar ways to produce the dynamics of the global states,
respectively. This means that the programmed computer and the brain do
not instantiate the same spatiotemporal pattern.
It seems obvious, then, that our dynamic analogy between the hardware
of the computer and the brain is too thin to warrant an application of sub-
strate-independence. A system may be associated with consciousness accord-
ing to SI if its inner workings are similar to those of brains. But this con-
dition is not fulfilled in our case. There may be other reasons to think that the
hardware of a computer is associated with consciousness, but we are here
concerned with reasons that turn on a close similarity.
Let me support this conclusion by considering brain simulations on
all-purpose machines in more detail. I have above suggested that the map
φ ◦ ψ does not preserve natural properties. This has important implica-
tions. Natural properties figure in the formulation of natural laws and we
run inductive inferences about such properties. “Grue,” by contrast, does
not refer to a natural property, and we would not run inferences about the
grueness of objects (Goodman 1983, sec. III.4, particularly 74).
This is a problem for the simulation argument. Not every possible
brain state will be associated with human-like experiences. Some activi-
ties of certain regions of the brain are necessary for conscious experiences.
Group together those states that are associated with consciousness and
form the set C of all computer states that are mapped to this set. The ques-
tion now is whether the computer has to be in a state of this set to be
associated with consciousness. Those who think that parts of the hardware
simulating a brain have consciousness face a dilemma at this point. They
can either say that the computer has to be in one of the states from C to be
associated with human-like experiences. But since C cannot be defined
using simple combinations of natural characteristics of the computer hard-
ware, this is to say that extremely artificial properties have empirical
significance and that they make a difference as to whether a system has
certain other properties. This is to run inferences along very artificial
properties, and this is not plausible, as the example of grueness shows.
The other alternative is to deny that the artificial properties on the com-
puter side have any significance for other properties. This is in effect to
say that only natural properties of the computer count for consciousness.
But from the viewpoint of the natural properties of the computer, it seems
incredible that the computer simulating a brain should be associated with
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consciousness, whereas computers doing all other kinds of things should
not. When we look at the natural properties on the side of the computer, it
does not make a qualitative difference whether the computer simulates a
galaxy or a cell. Thus, if a computer simulating a brain is associated with
consciousness, then so should computers simulating other things or com-
puters running other programs. The computer would be subject to conscious
states qua doing calculations and not qua running brain simulations. This
goes against the spirit of the simulation argument, which considers the com-
puter not qua calculator, but rather as simulating brains.
A possible objection against my argument is that the similarity
between computers and brains is much closer in brain simulations because
the computers do not only simulate the brain via the computerized model,
but also run computations that are similar to computations rooted in the
brain. In his statement of substrate independence quoted above, Bostrom
indeed refers to two systems that both run computations. Also, building
blocks of computers may resemble neurons. So isn’t there a much closer
analogy between computers and brains?
The problem with this is that analogies do not generally “add up” to
form tighter analogies. If there is one homomorphism between the behav-
iors of two systems with respect to some levels of descriptions, and
another with respect to others, it is a nontrivial question whether there are
third levels of descriptions that integrate the available information and
allow for a third, more detailed homomorphism.
The upshot for the simulation argument is clear enough. The analogy
between the hardware and the brain is too thin to warrant the application of
substrate-independence. It seems unlikely that higher-level properties of the
brain carry over to the computer just because of the map between computer
and brain states. And this is to say that the simulation argument fails.20
Claus Beisbart
University of Bern
NOTES
1. I take this term from Weatherson (2003).
2. See Bostrom (2005), Bostrom (2009) and Bostrom and Kulczycki (2011) for further
explication and elaboration of the argument. See Weatherson (2003) and Brueckner (2008)
for criticism and Bostrom (2005) and Bostrom (2009) for replies. For further references
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consult www.simulation-argument.com. As far as I am aware, the simulation argument has
not yet been discussed from the perspective of the philosophy of computer simulations.
3. Cf. Chalmers (2011, 338–41).
4. There is obviously more to be said about this argument and its use of probabilities.
See Bostrom (2003, Sec. V), Weatherson (2003), Bostrom (2005) and Bostrom and Kul-
czycki (2011) for further clarification and discussion about this point. Related details don’t
matter for our purposes.
5. Very roughly, von Neumann machines are built of processors (viz. CPUs) each of
which executes the commands from a program sequentially using a small number of reg-
isters. See Rechenberg (2000, ch. 3) for details.
6. See e.g., Izhikevich and Edelman (2008).
7. See http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/.
8. See e.g., Swoyer (1991), Suárez (2004), and Weisberg (2007). In the following, the
term “models” refers to what Frigg and Hartmann (2012, Sec. 1) call representational
models of phenomena, and not necessarily to models as structures that fulfill axioms.
9. I will not discuss what it means that characteristics such as force have certain mag-
nitudes because this question is not specific to models and simulations. One option is to be
realist about physical characteristics and their values.
10. Winsberg (1999) even distinguishes five types of models in the construction of a
simulation, but this is not necessary for our purposes.
11. See e.g., Peebles (1980, Part II) and Dolag et al. (2008) for N-body simulations.
12. See e.g., McMullin (1985), Frigg and Hartmann (2012, Sec. 1.1), Humphreys
(2004, Sec. 5.2) for abstraction and idealization.
13. See e.g. van Fraassen (1980, 43–46). My point here is not that representation is
equivalent to similarity or isomorphism in these models, an idea that has rightly been crit-
icized (e.g. Suárez 2004). My claim is only that similarity is decisive for the inference
between source and target.
14. Note that the analogy can only hold between the programmed computer and the
target. For simplicity though I will often drop the qualification “programmed.”
15. See also Zeigler (1976) and Chalmers (2011).
16. See e.g. Rechenberg (2000, 262–63).
17. Cf. Chalmers (2011, 329) for the following argument.
18. Chalmers (2011, 329) distinguishes between the physical implementations of finite-
state and of combinatorial-state automata. Since the latter implementation requires that the
states of the physical device are vectorized in components to which components of the
automaton states are mapped, it is much more demanding (ibid.). My point here is that the
brain and the programmed computer do not implement the same combinatorial-state
automaton, at least if we require that the brain and the computer and their states are broken
up into natural components.
19. Matters differ in so-called analog simulations. See Trenholme (1994), particularly
118–20.
20. I am very grateful to an anonymous referee and to P. Humphreys.
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